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ABSTRACT
Access control models are becoming increasingly important
in several application domains especially in distributed envi-
ronments like those addressed by Web Services. Established
approaches such as DAC [15], MAC [15] RBAC [11, 12, 22]
and others [7,6,13,1] suggest representing users in different
ways (labels, roles, credentials, etc.) in order to facilitate
the association of authorization and access control policies.
In intelligent and virtual ambient applications, users exist in
a controlled environment equipped with multimedia sensors
such as cameras and microphones, and use their terminals
in several application environments. In this paper, we study
the problem of integrating multimedia objects into access
control models and particularly role-based ones. Here, we
describe a Multimedia Access Control Language (M2ACL)
in which users and roles are described by using sets of mul-
timedia objects, greatly increasing the flexibility of access
control policies and their applicability to virtual and ambi-
ent intelligence (AmI) environments. We address potential
risks related to the use of multimedia objects by defining the
concept of filter functions used to aggregate a set of values
into a relevant one. Finally, we present a set of functional
specification and the experiments conducted to validate the
proposed approach.
Keywords
MultiMedia, Access Control Language
1. INTRODUCTION
The rapid evolution of Web-based distributed environments
has given rise to a variety of resource protection require-
ments. The work done by the security research commu-
nity to address these requirements has led to the definition
of a number of access control models, including DAC [15],
MAC [15] and others [7,6,13,1]. These models deal with sub-
jects whose access to resources is controlled in different ways.
To facilitate associating authorization and access policies to
users, early access models gathered users into groups (ad-
ministrators, managers, etc.) and defined hierarchical links
between them. More recently, three basic techniques have
been considered in the literature, i.e. roles, credentials, and
profiles. In the RBAC [11,12,22] approach, an authorization
manager defines a number of roles (to be later assigned to
users) and assigns to each role a set of permissions. Roles are
connected via hierarchical links to facilitate permission in-
heritance. While roles work especially well within organiza-
tions, credential-based techniques have proved to be effective
in the open Web environment, where the same subjects ac-
cess multiple independently managed services. For instance,
in [1], the authors focus on describing subjects based on cre-
dentials such as age, country, etc., and put forward the idea
of a credential hierarchy, later to be exploited in many prac-
tical systems. Similarly, in [6], user profiles have been used
to group users using various features (software, device, net-
work, etc.).
In this paper we study the impact of integrating descrip-
tions of subjects with multimedia objects. We describe here
a MultiMedia Access Control Language (M2ACL) where
users and roles can be defined via conditions on sets of mul-
timedia objects, increasing the expressive power and flexi-
bility of access policies. The need for including multimedia
objects is becoming more and more frequent in a number
of application fields, including entertainment, health-care,
e-government, e-learning, etc. In intelligent ambient appli-
cations, users work in a controlled environment equipped
with multimedia sensors such as cameras and microphones,
and use their terminals (desktop, information kiosks, lap-
tops and handheld devices) to access multiple applications.
However, the use of multimedia features in access control
models may cause uncertainty in enforcement decisions. We
address the problems of uncertainty when multimedia ob-
jects are used, even if the risk of false positives is entirely
acceptable in several applications. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe some appli-
cation scenarios motivating our approach. In Section 3, we
describe our core model by extending some components of
RBAC (Roles, Hierarchy, and Constraints) to handle mul-
timedia objects. In Section 3, we briefly outline the syntax
of a language, M2ACL, and discuss the model underlying.
In Section 5, we present an application scenario while in
Section 6 the experimental results. Section 7 concludes our
paper and snapshots some of our future directions.
2. MOTIVATING SCENARIOS
We start by describing two sample scenarios showing how
the use of multimedia objects can be beneficial in Web-based
access control.
2.1 Scenario 1
The first scenario deals with the access to a hospital, includ-
ing a research department with different labs, some of them
requiring a high level of security (e.g. because they stock
viruses and bacteria). The lab has several surveillance cam-
eras at the entrance doors of each department and in each
room of all departments. As detailed below, each lab’s staff
is divided into several groups depending on the role they
occupy and the department they belong to:
• Lab technician handling bio samples must wear white
suits and grey caps. They have access to storing areas
and cold rooms.
• Researchers responsible of testing viruses must wear
yellow suits with intoxication masks. So dressed, they
are allowed to enter testing area and cold rooms.
• Security guards supervise access rooms and main hall.
In order to make themselves recognizable by other staff
and visitors, they must wear red berets and dark navy
suits.
In order to enforce the dress code as well access permissions
based on identity, the authorization manager needs to de-
fine roles on the basis of multimedia objects (as well as on
traditional credentials) and to associate appropriate permis-
sions to any combination of multimedia objects and creden-
tials. Once the dress code has been verified, staff member
can complete getting their role by using any authentication
technique.
2.2 Scenario 2
The second scenario is an open-web application loosely in
the line of Second Life, where an entertainment company
organizes an Internet-based aftermath to in-presence parties
taking place in a disco. The company wishes to invite to the
post-party meeting (with different roles) only people who
showed up for the original party. Obviously, there is no
directory of names and profiles. A ”virtual bouncer” at the
door of the Internet party will use social event snapshots (or
individual pictures) to assign roles to corresponding people.
• DJs wore a baseball cap and a yellow T-shirt with the
promotional logo of the virtual disco. In the virtual
edition of the party, they have access to backstage ar-
eas and virtual hi-fi equipment.
• Professional dancers were dressed in costumes. They
are allowed to enter the stage and other privileged
dance areas.
• Party-goers followed no special dress code. They have
access to the main hall only.
After verification and role assignment, people are redirected
to authorized ”virtual rooms” of the Internet party.
3. PROPOSED APPROACH
We now define the main concepts needed for a full un-
derstanding of our multimedia access control language. In
particularly, we introduce Multimedia Identifiers and their
related components (multimedia objects, multimedia func-
tions, filter functions, etc.) which represent the core of our
approach.
3.1 Definitions
Definition 1 - Multimedia Object: allows representing
several types of multimedia data such as text, image, video,
salient object, speech, etc. Due to its simplicity and its high
expression power, here we adopt the MPEG-7 compatible
description model provided in [5]. Therefore, a Multimedia
Object Mo is represented as follows:
Mo : (idMo, O
∗, A∗, F ∗, R∗) (1)
where:
1. idMo: represents the identifier of the multimedia ob-
ject
2. O: contains the raw data of the object (image, video,
or audio) stored as a BLOB file or URI
3. A: is the metadata describing the multimedia object.
It describes both user- and context-related information
and can be written as: (a1 : v1, a2 : v2, ...) where ai and
vi represent an attribute and its corresponding value
(ex. age: 18, profession: student, etc.)
4. F : describes the physical content of a multimedia ob-
ject (such as Color Histogram, Color distribution, Tex-
ture Histogram, shapes, Duration, Audio freq., Ampli-
tude, Band no., etc.)
5. R: describes the set of relations existing between mul-
timedia objects 1.
For instance, the following multimedia object: Mo1(id =
1, O =′ yellow suit.jpg′, A =′ object.name : suit′, F =′
DominantColor = (14, 24, 20)′, null) represents an image
yellow_suit.jpg describing an object ”suit”having a yellow
dominant color (in the RGB color space) without any link
with other objects.
Definition 2 - User: the set of multimedia items used to
describe a subject. As multimedia objects can be used for
user description in several applications, we can formalize the
user notion as follows:
U : (idu,Mo
∗
)) (2)
Where:
1. Idu is the user identifier
2. Mo
∗
represents the set of reference multimedia objects
describing the user.
1These relations can be spatial, semantic, similarity, tempo-
ral, etc.
Definition 3 - Multimedia Function: is used to handle
the comparison between (and feature extraction from) mul-
timedia objects. Many types of multimedia functions have
been proposed in the literature and some of them are avail-
able in commercial systems. For instance, some of them are
provided as extensions to SQL-operators in DBMSs such
as Oracle and DB2 [8, 17], while others are accessible via
APIs [14, 19] and web services [2] within special-purpose
platforms for multimedia data processing. A complete re-
view of such functions and their applications are out of the
scope of this paper; the interested reader can refer to [3]. In
our approach, we formally write a multimedia function f as
follows:
f(Mo
∗
,Mo∗)→ (αBf )∗ (3)
where:
1. Mo represents a Reference Multimedia Object (RMO)
usually defined by the authorization manager.
2. Mo represents an input multimedia object. It can be
provided by multimedia devices of different types such
as surveillance cameras, webcams, sound recorders,
etc.
3. (αBf ) is a returned threshold representing the native
confidence score of a Boolean value B with respect to
the multimedia function. It varies in [0,1] interval.
Definition 4 - Filter Function: is applied to the out-
come of a comparison to select or compute a single value
for decision-making. A filter function can be defined by
any probabilistic function such as the combination rule
of Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (DS) [9, 20] or of
Bayesian Decision theory [18]. It is formally written as:
µ(f∗, ε)→ αBµ (4)
where:
1. f is a multimedia function;
2. ε is an uncertainty threshold (∈ [0, 1]) representing
the percentage of noise that can affect the result (e.g.
lightings, multimedia function precision, multimedia
device performance, etc. ). The more  is high, the
more uncertainty increases. If omitted,  = 0;
3. αBµ is the filtered confidence score (∈ [0, 1]) of a
Boolean value B with respect to the filter function.
Filter functions are important because the uncertainty of
similarity functions may lead to wrong decisions, potentially
granting access to unauthorized users or denying it to legit-
imate ones. In many applications, however, the risk of false
positives is fully acceptable. In our first scenario, for in-
stance, a (partial) violation of the dress code (i.e. because
someone wears a white rather than a grey cap), would never
conduct to a serious security breach. In the second scenario,
the occasional Internet party admission of someone who is
an identical twin of a participant to the original real-life
event, although undesirable, would not disrupt the scheme.
In other cases where security breaches are crucial, filters can
be used in conjunction with ordinary credentials to increase
access verification [4, 3].
Definition 5 - Multimedia Condition allows the autho-
rization manager to handle the analysis of a set of inputs
using none or more multimedia functions and a filter func-
tion. A condition is true iif the result returned by the filter
function is satisfied within the Boolean operator and the
predefined threshold. A multimedia predicate P is formally
written as:
P : [Mo|µ|e]θv (5)
where:
1. µ is a filter function;
2. e is an expression;
3. θ is a multimedia comparison operator containing tra-
ditional operators (e.g.=, 6=, <,>,≤,≥ etc.) and sim-
ilarity operators used in multimedia queries (such as
range [16] and K-Nearest Neighbor queries [10]);
4. v is the validation value. It could be a simple or com-
plex (such as Mo)
Example: Let us take the first scenario described in Sec-
tion 2 and show how the authorization manager (AM) can
identify researchers wearing yellow suits in our approach.
We assume that:
1. the combination rule of Dempster-Shafer’s theory of
evidence (DS) is used as the filter function.
2. two different multimedia functions f1 and f2 are used
to analyze multimedia objects:
• f1: is based on feature extraction;
• f2: is based on SVM classifiers
The AM defines the following function contents as:
f1(Mo1(. . . , O =′ suityellow.jpg′, . . . ),Mo10(. . . , O =
′snapshot lab.jpg′, . . . ))
f2(Mo1(. . . , O =′ suityellow.dat′, . . . ),Mo10(. . . , O =
′snapshot lab.jpg′, . . . ))
where the RMO is a suit yellow image and dat file
(or folder) to be compared with an input object called
snapshot lab.jpg using the two multimedia functions. He
also defines the following multimedia predicate to detect the
existence of yellow suits in the picture:
P1 : µ((f1, f2), 0.1) > 0.8
Let us assume that f1 returns a confidence score of 80%,
and f2 a confidence score of 60%. These scores represent the
probability of validating the concept of detecting the yellow
suit in the snapshot image (snapshot lab.jpg). They are
related to the mass functions (mi) defined in the DS theory
of evidence. For instance, in our case m1(true) holds the
probability of detecting the yellow suit which is determined
using the first function whereas m2(true) holds the same
concept thus determined with the second function. Accord-
ing to the DS theory combination rule, we can then compute
the filtered confidence score as follows:
m1,2(true) =
m1(true)×m2(true) +m1(true)×m2({true,
1−K
false}) +m1({true, false})×m2(true)
(6)
where: K = m1(true)×m2(false) +m1(false)×m2(true)
represents the conflict in the combination rule. In order
to take into account uncertainty when comparing multi-
media objects, the uncertainty threshold specified by the
authorization manager in the filter function is deduced
from the probabilities of the concept to be determined:
m1(true) = m1(true) −m1(true) × ε = 0.8 − 0.80.1 = 0.72
m2(true) = m2(true)−m2(true)× ε = 0.6− 0.60.1 = 0.54.
However, if m1,2 = (false) is being calculated, (i.e., the fact
that the yellow suit is not detected in the input image), the
threshold would be deduced from m1(false) and m2(false).
• m1({true, false}) = 1 − (m1(true) + m1(false)) =
0.08
• m2({true, false}) = 1 − (m2(true) + m2(false)) =
0.06
After applying the combination rule, we obtain the following
filtered confidence value: m1,2(true) = 0.786
Therefore, the application will assume that no yellow suit is
identified within the provided snapshot, as the evidence for it
lies below the acceptance threshold defined in the predicate.
Definition 6 - Multimedia Identifier: allows assigning
users to a set of predefined multimedia-based clusters using
the multimedia objects that identify them. This technique
resembles what happens in traditional approaches (partic-
ularly RBAC) where users are assigned to a set of groups
or roles using their characteristics (most often on their job
functions). A user assigned to a specified Multimedia Iden-
tifier MId activates it when the objects identifying the user
satisfy the identifier’s multimedia predicate. We formally
define our MId model as follows:
MId = (IdMId , description, P
θ∗
, State) (7)
where:
• IdMId represents the identifier of the Multimedia Iden-
tifier ;
• description represents its description (e.g., ”lab tech-
nician in full gear”);
• P θ∗ is a set of multimedia predicates linked together
using logical operators (AND, OR, NOT);
• State) represents its Boolean state (enabled or dis-
abled).
Such representation adds flexibility to classical specifications
and approaches, making it possible to define generalized
multimedia groups or roles by combining MId with tradi-
tional models.
For example, MId1 : (1,
′Researcher′, P1, enabled) and
MId2 : (2,
′ Lab Technician′, P2, enabled) allow defining two
Multimedia Identifiers based on yellow and white suits re-
spectively. Thus, each user wearing a yellow or white suit
would be automatically assigned to MId1 or MId2 respec-
tively iif P1 and P2 are valid.
Definition 7 - Multimedia Identifier Links: in the
RBAC model, the roles hierarchy is usually described as an
inheritance relation between different roles which mirrors an
organization’s chain of commands. This can be readily ap-
plied to relations that might exist between different Mids
(e.g., between a lab technician in full gear and another one
wearing ordinary clothes save for the grey cap and the sur-
gical mask) and extended by additional types of relations
(e.g., containment) as well. The link model is formalized as
follows:
Link : (idL,MIdStart ,MIdEnd , type) (8)
where:
• IdL represents the identifier of the link existing be-
tween the different MIds;
• MIdStart represents a start node;
• MIdEnd represents an end node;
• type describes the type of link established between two
MIds. A type could be a hierarchical link, a contain-
ment link, a similarity link, etc.
For instance, if Link1 is: (IdL1 ,MId1 ,MId2 ,
′ hierarchical′),
all permissions of MId2 will be inherited by MId1
2.
3.2 Constrained M2ACL
In RBAC, constraints support separation of duty relations
when defining roles. Such relations are used to prevent con-
flict of interests when managing hierarchical levels of au-
thority. In M2ACL, such relations need to be addressed
differently, due to the use of multimedia objects. Two
multimedia-specific types of separation duty are defined be-
low:
2The link model provides enough expressive power to repre-
sent relationships between MIds. Of course, several graphs
can be established according to the types of links. In ad-
dition, it can be effectively extended to other components
of our access control model. However, this issue will not be
addressed here.
3.2.1 Multimedia Static Separation of Duty (MSSD)
Conflict of interests arises when a multimedia object describ-
ing a user is associated to several Mids with conflicting per-
missions. Such constraints reduce the number of permissions
attributed to a user. It defines restrictions for User/MId as-
signment. For instance, consider MIdi , MIdj and the user
U1. Let MIdi be defined using I1, using I2, and U1 identi-
fied by the image UI1. U1 is automatically assigned to both
Mids due to the salient objects existence in both I1 and I2 as
well as in UI1. In order to prevent conflicts, the authoriza-
tion manager should be granted the possibility to avoid such
assignments. For this reason, we define a multimedia static
separation of duty notion to control User/MId assignment.
It is formalized as follows:
MSSD(idmssd, idMId
∗, Card) (9)
where:
• idmssd represents the identifier of the MSSD relation;
• idMId∗ represents the set of MIds on which the MSSD
relation is applied. This set contains at least two iden-
tifiers;
• Card represents the cardinality (greater than 1) indi-
cating a combination of MIds that would constitute a
violation of the MSSD relations.
For example, if MSSD1 is defined as:
(1, {MIdi ,MIdj ,MIdz , }, 2), this means that users are
not allowed to be simultaneously assigned to two of the
three MIds.
3.2.2 Multimedia Dynamic Separation of Duty
(MDSD)
In the RBAC model, dynamic separation of duty is used
to prevent users from activating simultaneously roles that
may arise conflict of interests. In M2ACL, dynamic sepa-
rations of duty add operational flexibility to the model. For
instance, For example, let us consider a user U1 assigned
to both lab technician MId1 and researcher MId2 . Ac-
cording to the hospital policy, U1 is not allowed to carry
on teaching activities (e.g., grade graduate student papers)
while he is in full gear, working in the virology lab. Such
issue can be addressed using MDSD. In our model, we define
a MDSD as follows:
MSSD(idmssd, id
∗
MId , Card) (10)
where:
• idmssd represents the identifier of the MSSD relation;
• idMId∗ represents a set of attached MIds. This set
contains at least two identifiers;
• Card represents the cardinality (greater than 2) indi-
cating a combination of MIds that would constitute a
violation of the MSSD relations.
For example, if MDSD1 is: (1, {MIdi ,MIdj ,MIdz}, 2), this
means users are not allowed to activate simultaneously two
of the three MIds.
Figure 1: Architecture of our approach
4. FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION
In this Section, we describe the architecture of our system
for processing Multimedia Identifiers and we point out some
of the functions essential for a flexible enforcement of the
M2ACL language. On the basis of such functions, the sys-
tem decides whether a user U has the right to execute a
specific operation by retrieving the set of Multimedia Iden-
tifiers to which U is assigned3.
The main activities performed by our architecture are shown
in Figure 1. In particular:
• Multimedia Identifier Retrieval: returns the set
of Multimedia Identifiers assigned to a specified user
identified by the set of multimedia objects seized (or
captured). If there are no Multimedia Identifiers as-
signed to the specified user, the system denies him from
accessing the system.
• Retrieved Multimedia Identifier Filtering: re-
turns the set of Multimedia Identifiers satisfying the
defined constraints and conditions.
The following procedure tests the validity of a given multi-
media predicate based on the input and reference multimedia
objects:
3Here, we shall not deal with multimedia object indexing
techniques which are essential for our language’s enforce-
ment (and, indeed, for any kind of multimedia retrieval) to
scale well. Rather, we assume a multimedia data handling
layer to provide an indexing facility, which should be easily
extensible with new features.
Algorithm 1: InvokeP
Input: P , // a multimedia predicate
Moj
∗
, // the predefined multimedia objects
Mo∗i // the input multimedia objects
Output: Res // the returned result ∈ {0, 1}
f []= get MF(P ) // f[]: table of multimedia functions1
µ = get FF (P )2
ε = get FF UT (P )3
for each(fi IN f []) do4
(αB)∗ ← fi(Mo∗k,Moj
∗
) // Mo∗k ⊆Mo∗i5
end6
Res = Evaluate P (P , µ((αB)∗, ε))7
return Res8
The Invoke_P procedure takes a P , an input multimedia
object and the predefined multimedia objects and returns a
result Res ∈ {0, 1}. In the first three steps, the multimedia
functions, the filter function and the uncertainty threshold
ε related to the P are retrieved. Each multimedia function
is executed against a set of defined multimedia objects Mo∗j
in step 5 taking a set of multimedia objects Mo∗i as input.
The result of the execution is a set of thresholds sent to the
filter function. In step 7, the P is evaluated based on the
returned result of the filter function.
Multimedia Identifier Retrieval (MIdR): Returns the
set of Multimedia Identifiers to which a user U (identified
by a set of Multimedia Objects) is automatically assigned.
It is written as follows:
Algorithm 2: MIdR
Input: Mo∗i , // an input Multimedia object taken from
multimedia devices,
M∗Id // a set of stored Multimedia Identifiers
Output: Ass M∗Id // assigned Multimedia Identifiers
for each(MIdi IN M
∗
Id) do1
P
∗
=get P
∗
(MId)2
for each(Pi IN P ∗) do3
Moj
∗
= get Mo(P )4
Result∗ ← Invoke P (Pi,Mo∗i ,Moj
∗
)5
end6
if (compute(Result, P
∗
)) then7
Ass M∗Id ←MIdi8
end9
end10
return Ass M∗Id11
The above procedure retrieves all Multimedia Identifiers
that a user (identified by a multimedia object) is assigned
to. The procedure takes a multimedia object and a pre-
defined set of Multimedia Identifiers as input and returns
a set of Multimedia Identifiers with matched P . For each
Multimedia Identifier in the specified set, we first extract
predicates and their related multimedia objects. Then, we
test the validity of each predicate Pi based on the prede-
fined multimedia objects and the seized one. The returned
result (containing the results returned by all the P defined in
the P∗) is computed according to the original P∗. In other
terms, logical operators are evaluated depending on the re-
turned results. If the evaluation succeeds the Multimedia
Identifier is assigned to the table Ass MId∗.
MDSD Constraints Validation (MDSD CV): tests if
users are allowed to activate a stored Multimedia Identifier
regarding a set of MDSD constraints. We define it below:
Algorithm 3: MDSD CV
Input: MId // a Multimedia Identifier,
MDSD∗ // a predefined set of Multimedia Dynamic Seperation
of Duty
Output: valid
valid=true1
for each(MDSDi IN MDSD
∗) do2
if get MDSD(MId,MDSDi) then3
valid = false4
break5
end6
end7
return valid8
get MDSD(MId,MDSDi) function tests if an Multimedia
Identifier MId exists in the Multimedia Dynamic Separation
of Duty MDSDi.
Multimedia Identifier Filtering (MIdF ): returns the
set of Multimedia Identifiers valid for a given user U using
the MDSD CV algorithm defined above. In fact, the algo-
rithm tests if the Multiemdia Ddynamic Separation of Duty
(MDSD∗) provided as Input and specified for the given user
U are valid in order to retrieve all attributed Multimedia
Identifiers. It is described as follows:
Figure 2: Multimedia Identifier Specification Inter-
face
Algorithm 4: MIdF
Input: M∗Id, MDSD
∗
Output: Filtered M∗Id
for each (MIdi IN M
∗
Id) do1
if (MDSD CV (MIdi , MDSD
∗)) then2
Filtered M∗Id ←MIdi3
end4
end5
return Filtered M∗Id6
5. IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 Prototype
In order to validate our approach, we have developed a
prototype to ease the definition and the manipulation of
M2ACL Multimedia Identifiers. Our prototype provides
the authorization manager the possibility to create Multi-
media Identifiers using graphical components. It is con-
stituted of two different interfaces; one for specifying Mul-
timedia Identifiers’ simple characteristics (MId, Descrip-
tion, and Status) and the other to define related multi-
media predicates. In the first interface (see Figure 2) the
authorization manager defines the id, the description and
the status of the Multimedia Identifier to be specified.
Thereafter, he uses the table to add multimedia predicates
which can be defined using our second interface (see Figure
3) and enters the Boolean operators in order to create an
expression. For multimedia predicates, the authorization
manager is able to specify:
• The filter function and its related uncertainty thresh-
old
• The logical operator (>, <, =, etc.)
Figure 3: Multimedia Predicate Specification Inter-
face
Figure 4: Mid described using XML
• The overall threshold to which the result should be
compared to.
• The set of multimedia functions and their reference
multimedia objects
The set of reference multimedia objects can be acquired
using a simple browsing window or using snapshots from
live broadcasting Webcam.
After creating the Multimedia Identifier, the authorization
manager can also export it into an XML document (see Fig-
ure 4).
5.2 Application Scenario
Let us consider again our second scenario. It is the case of a
research hospital with different labs having a camera at each
entrance. The system gives access to its staff upon several
MId1 MId2
Figure 5: Examples of Multimedia Identifiers
objects depending on their Multimedia Identifiers, as well as
on their credentials. Figure 5 shows the multimedia objects
that constitute Multimedia Identifiers.
These multimedia objects are described as follows:
• Mo1.O = "yellow_suit.jpg"
• Mo3.O = "safety_goggles.jpg"
• Mo4.O = "white_suit.jpg"
• Mo5.O = "grey_caps.jpg"
MId1 is activated when users are wearing yellow suits
and safety goggles, it is defined as follows (we use the
same predicate as defined in the Multimedia Identifier sec-
tion): MId1 : (Id1,
′Researcher′, P1, enabled) where P1 :
µ((f1, f2), 0, 1) > 0.8 (f1 and f2 are two multimedia func-
tions on feature extraction and SVM classifiers respectively).
MId2 is activated when users are wearing white
suits and grey caps. It is described as follows:
MId2 : (2,
′ Labtechnician′, P2, enabled) where
P2 : µ((f1, f2), 0, 1) > 0.7.
Using our model, the authorization manager is able to define
the following set of tasks:
1. Defining separation of duty constraints to control Mul-
timedia Identifier state operations (activation, assign-
ment, etc.).
2. Assigning to each role a set of permissions described
as approval for executing a set of operations upon a
set of objects. When a defined permission is specified
to a given user, this means that the subject has been
granted the possibility to perform an action upon spec-
ified objects (resources to be protected from unautho-
rized access). These objects can be of different types
such as room access, web applications, multimedia ob-
jects access (images, video scenes, etc.) depending on
the domain of application. Both permissions and ob-
jects definition is out of the scope of this paper. These
permissions can be defined as:
• Permissions∗1 →MId1
• Permissions∗2 →MId2
3. Creating a hierarchical link between Multime-
dia Identifiers A1 and A2 to preserve the au-
thorization line of authority between lab techni-
cians and researchers. The link is defined as:
Link(001,MId1 ,MId2 ,
′ hierarchical′) Where 001 is
the id of the link, MId1 and MId2 represent the Mul-
timedia Identifiers of the start and the end node. The
defined link permits the inheritance of permissions be-
tween MId1 and MId2 . In other terms, MId1 (re-
searchers) inherits automatically the permissions as-
signed to MId2 (lab technician). This way, MId1 has
a set of permissions assigned by the authorization man-
ager and a set of permissions inherited from MId2 due
to the hierarchical link existing between both Multi-
media Identifiers.
When a user U arrives at the entrance of the department, a
picture (or several ones) of her will be captured by a surveil-
lance camera in order to detect to which Multimedia Identi-
fier she should be effectively assigned.
6. EXPERIMENTS
In this Section, we describe the set of experiments conducted
to test the relevance of our approach. The tests were made
on a Pentium IV 1.7 GHz with 512 MB RAM and using
a USB Webcam. Our database contains snapshots of ob-
jects which form the Multimedia Identifiers to be created
and the followed instance images. We used a multimedia
function based on color object recognition and a SVM clas-
sifier. This later computes decisions based on a set of classes
representing the trained images (See [21] for more details).
The set of experiments we performed are divided into several
categories:
• Filter Functions Relevance: permits to test the rele-
vance of filter function regarding a determined error
ratio from multimedia functions.
• Filter Functions Evolution: reveals the evolution of
filter functions computed with an increased value of
uncertainty threshold.
• Execution Time: allows to detect the processing time
to compute a final decision from the filter function.
6.1 Category 1: Filter Functions Relevance
The objective behind this test is to calculate the error ratio
rose when detecting a person wearing different objects in
order to validate the relevance of filter functions. In fact, we
have trained 10 different classes representing objects to be
recognized. The list of classes is described in the following:
1. Black Sweater
2. Black TShirt
3. Blue TShirt
4. Brown Jacket
5. Brown Sweater
6. Gray Cap
7. Green Sweater
8. White Shirt
Class N◦ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Error Rate 0.24 0.44 0.67 0.35 0.96 0.01 0.38 0.66 0.14 1.0
DS Result 1.0 1.0 0.01 1.0 0.01 1.0 1.0 0.01 1.0 0.0
Avg Result 0.71 0.55 0.36 0.62 0.13 0.9 0.6 0.37 0.79 0.09
Min Result 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Max Result 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Figure 6: Relevance Results computed with different filter functions
9. White Sweater
10. White TShirt
We have taken 100 images representing people wearing the
same object for each of the described classes. These snap-
shots were taken in different environmental conditions (light-
ings changes, different positions, etc.). Consequently, for
each input image, the SVM function returns a threshold re-
lated to the relevance of the object detected. The error ratio
is calculated based on the number of times the SVM function
invokes a decision different than the supposed one. There-
after, to validate the advantage of using filter functions, we
compute the returned results from each input image to sev-
eral filter functions (DS, Avg, Min and Max) in order to get
a unique threshold representing the relevance of the decision.
We obtained the following results:
The error ratio is calculated for each of the classes based
on 100 input images (representing each class) taken in sev-
eral environmental conditions which lead to a divergence
in the result when detecting the corresponding class. The
calculated error ratio depends actually on the relevance of
the multimedia functions used, the environmental conditions
and users’ behavior. This means that the values determined
above might vary if one of the latter conditions changes.
Nevertheless, what we are interested in is the result returned
by the filter functions that are supposed to reflect the final
decision (whether a given user is assigned to a Multimedia
Identifier and has the right to activate it). As we can see
in Table 6.1, the Min and the Max functions return contin-
uously the minimum and the maximum thresholds detected
from within the 100 thresholds returned which is (0.09 and
0.9). As for the Avg filter function the result depends on
the values of the thresholds returned. Thus, let us take the
case of class number 2 which is the Black TShirt. In this
case, the Avg function has computed a result equal to 0.55
which considered low regarding the fact the input images
represent the class to be detected. In other terms, a value of
0.55 might reduce the potential risk of access violation (error
ratio = 0.44) thus decease ”information availability”. On the
other side for the same class, the DS has computed a value of
1.0 which means that the system is certain that the overall
decision should be affected to the class Black TShirt even if
the error ratio is relatively high (0.44). Now let us take the
example of class number 3 which is the Blue TShirt. The
error ratio determined is equal to 0.67 which is relatively
high. In other terms the system is effectively certain that
from the 100 input images provided there are at least 67
that doesn’t correspond to the class Blue TShirt. The DS
filter function computes a value equal to 0.01 (less than the
value of the Avg function) indicating the final decision.
6.2 Category 2: Filter Functions Evolution
Figure 8: Computed Thresholds vs. Uncertainty
threshold
This test is elaborated to determine the evolution of fil-
ter functions regarding an increased number of uncertainty
thresholds; we invoked multimedia functions with several
snapshots of the object to be detected. All returned thresh-
olds are computed with different filter functions such as Max,
Min, Average, and DS and the returned result is compared
to the one specified by the authorization manager (see Table
6.1.
The objective of these tests was to detect whether a certain
user is wearing a grey cap or not. We provided the multi-
media function a set of 50 input images in which the person
is wearing a grey cap with different lighting conditions. The
result varies depending on the environmental conditions and
the human related behavior (lighting, user positioning, etc.).
It returned a set of thresholds between 60% and 90% shown
in the following graph (Figure 8).
Figure 8 shows that for a given interval of uncertainty
thresholds between 0.1 and 0.5, the DS-Theory has con-
served its result. However, with an uncertainty threshold
= 0.1, the Min function has returned a 0.54 value which
is considered relatively low according to the fact that the
user was wearing a grey cap and this might lead to an un-
necessary denial of access. Anyway, the returned thresholds
depend directly on the multimedia function used and the ob-
jective behind defining Multimedia Identifiers (precaution-
based or access control). When using different multimedia
functions results might vary depending on the functions’ pre-
cision. Thus, for highly secure environments, the authoriza-
tion manager could use the Min function in order to control
at maximum his platform.
6.3 Category 3: Execution Time
Here, we determine the execution time taken to compute
a final decision from the filter functions. Nevertheless, the
process time of multimedia functions is not taken into con-
ε 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
DS 1.0 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.89 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.0
MIN 0.54 0.48 0.42 0.36 0.3 0.24 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.0
MAX 0.8 0.71 0.62 0.53 0.44 0.35 0.26 0.17 0.08 0.0
AVG 0.66 0.59 0.51 0.44 0.36 0.29 0.22 0.14 0.07 0.0
Figure 7: Computed Results from different Filter Functions
Figure 9: Execution Time
sideration which is related to the multimedia function used.
In order to calculate the execution time of filter function, we
have provided 10 input thresholds for each step to different
filter functions (DS, Avg, Min, Max) and after we deter-
mined the time computed by each of the functions. The
result is shown in Figure 9:
In essence, it shows the time evolution regarding a number
of input thresholds. As we can see, the DS filter function has
the highest time values for an increased number of thresh-
olds. Nevertheless these values should not affect the final
decision invocation time due to its low estimation against
multimedia time process.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented M2ACL, a multimedia
access control language based on the RBAC model, where
users and roles can be defined using multimedia objects. Our
approach extends the notion of roles to allow assigning users
to a set of predefined multimedia based clusters (known as
Multimedia Identifiers) by analyzing the multimedia objects
that identify these users. Nevertheless, the use of multime-
dia objects within access control models creates potential
risks of uncertainty when computing decisions. This is why
we defined the concept of filter functions to reduce the pos-
sibility of computing unauthorized decisions. We provided
an adaptation of the combination rules used in the theory
of evidence, in order to aggregate the set of values into a
relevant one. We also presented a set of functional specifica-
tions to ease the implementation of the defined model and
we described our prototype that assists the authorization
manager in creating Multimedia Identifiers. Moreover, we
discussed a set of experiments targeting filter functions rel-
evance and evolution while computing an increased number
of uncertainty thresholds. We also analyzed the process-
ing time during filter function evaluation. Several directions
need to be explored. For instance, we plan to extend the
concept of easy migration from RBAC model into ours in or-
der to assist authorization managers to define hybrid roles,
textual and multimedia-based.
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